I have interests in philosophy of mind (especially perception), epistemology, value theory, emotion, and aesthetics. I recently completed a dissertation in which I argue that experiences that have pleasant or painful affective valences—experiences that feel good or bad, e.g., the good taste of coffee or the pain of a stubbed toe—disclose the value of their objects. I argue that there is an epistemic principle linking such affectively valenced states with their objects that is independent of representational features of mind. This epistemic principle unites sophisticated reasoners like ourselves with simple animals who navigate the world by feel (snails, say). Such a principle promises to ground the objectivity of tastes, and to help us understand the empirical credentials of emotions and aesthetic judgments.
I am the Consortium for Faculty Diversity Postdoctoral Fellow and a visiting assistant professor at Swarthmore College from 2025-27.
Contact me at sofia dot berinstein at gmail dot com.