I am a PhD student at the University of Pittsburgh. Prior to Pittsburgh I studied at Brandeis University, MIT, and The Cooper Union. I work on perception, emotion, and epistemology. I am also interested in ethics, aesthetics, and ancient philosophy, among other historical topics.
I am focused on perception's affective character, specifically the question of whether it is epistemically significant. I think it is, and in my dissertation I defend a novel non-cognitive principle of epistemic significance: value inheritance—experiences that hurt or feel good inherit their relational value from that of their objects. The core notion comes from Aristotle, who says “In fact, to feel pleasure or pain (to hêdesthai kai lupeisthai) is precisely to be active (energein) with the perceptual mean toward the good or bad as such.”* The shift away from a purely cognitivist epistemology of perception promises to help us better understand practical deliberation, moral understanding, and engagement with art, as practiced by perceiving subjects.
I am able to teach in a variety of areas connected to my research: ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of emotion, aesthetics, metaethics, ancient philosophy, and philosophy of science. I find teaching to be an independently interesting and valuable pursuit, and approach it with the deepest respect for learners, as peers in the process of doing philosophy.
*(de An. III. 7 431a8-12, re-quoted from Moss, based on the Hicks translation)